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Transaction costs include a number of different monitoring, measuring and enforcing costs.
Institutions together with a number of other variables determine the magnitude of these costs.
The question addressed in this article is the extent to which the effects of particular institutions
on transaction costs can be separately identified. This is of interest because institutions which
lower transaction costs allow higher net social benefits to be achieved (NORTH 1990: 3-10,
EGGERTSSON 1990: 10-25). 
At one extreme is the possibility that the transaction cost determined part of net social benefits
is fully decomposable into additively separable effects, each attributable to an institution or
other variable. In such a world, changing a particular institution or the value of any of the
variables determining the magnitude of transaction costs will have an effect on net social benefits
which is always of the expected sign and magnitude. In fact transaction cost analysis has
implicitly recognized additive non-separability for particular variables determining transaction
costs. However, it has not addressed the implications of each of a number of variables having
additively non-separable effects.
This article examines the implications of separability breaking down. The most important
consequence is that incremental analytical methods through which the effects of discrete
institutions and policy variables are discovered have to be abandoned. In the incremental
approach, the assumption is that an efficient institution will work even better when combined
with efficiency enhancing norms or efficiency enhancing distributions of power. When additive
separability breaks down, an institution which is more efficient in one context will not
necessarily be more efficient in another. The same is also true for informal institutions. Norms
which have served to reduce transaction costs in one context may raise them in another.  The
analysis of efficiency then demands that the most important variables with additively non-
2separable effects are identified and the functional nature of the interdependence explored.
The problem is established by distinguishing between two components of the overall transaction
cost effect of  institutions. Institutions can bring about a change in monitoring costs and also
determine the extent of contestation. Each of these effects translates into an effect on net social
benefits. We term these the monitoring cost and contestation cost components of the overall
institutional effect on net social benefits. We then show that each of these components is jointly
determined by the additively non-separable effects of institutions and at least one other variable.
The joint effect of the institution is thus determined by the additively non-separable effects of
all these variables.
Section I defines institutions and transaction costs. Separable and non-separable functions for
net social benefits are defined. The former are shown to be necessary for the validity of the
incremental approach to transaction cost  analysis. In section II the effect of institutions on net
social benefits is partially decomposed into the monitoring cost and contestation cost
components of the institutional effect. Section III demonstrates that each of these components
is determined by the non-separable effect of institutions and at least one other variable. The
basic argument is established with reference to a comparison between two institutions each of
which identifies a different set of agents as the residual claimant. The measured efficiency of the
institutions and their ranking changes with changes in the values of a number of variables with
non-separable effects on net social benefits. Sections IV to VI  extend this result by considering
a range of other institutions which have other variables with non-separable effects. Section IV
considers the rate of transition to well-defined rights and shows why weakly-defined rights can
sometimes perform better. Section V returns to well-defined rights and compares large and
small firms. Section VI compares the effects of informal institutions which are more or less
generalized in their scope. Section VII concludes.
3I. INSTITUTIONS AND TRANSACTION COSTS
Institutions are rules which impose constraints on the actions of agents (SCHOTTER 1981:
11, NORTH 1990: 3, KNIGHT 1992: 2). Rules about which side of the road to drive on or
more complex property rules about who makes which decisions and for what reward are
institutions. How the institution is enforced may vary quite a lot. In some cases (such as road
rules) where the institution solves a coordination problem, the institution may be largely self-
enforcing once the rule becomes widely known. In other cases there may be incentives to free-
ride or distributive conflicts and here third-party enforcement may be an essential part of
maintaining the institution. 
Theory distinguishes between formal and informal institutions. Formal institutions are backed
up by third party enforcement, usually by the state. In practice this may be more or less
regularly invoked. Formal institutions include property rights, taxes, subsidies and regulations.
Informal institutions are rules which are voluntarily observed as norms without third-party
enforcement. Formal institutions are actually usually maintained by a combination of  third-party
enforcement and norm-based self-enforcement by the agents involved. The degree of self-
enforcement can determine the contestation costs of formal institutions. Once in place,
institutions reduce uncertainty about agent actions. The positive or negative implications for
output and welfare follow. 
There is an important distinction between ex ante and ex post institutions. When institutions
are discussed as policy variables, they usually refer to the ex ante rules being considered for
a particular situation. The qualifier ex ante refers to the fact that the rules have not in fact been
implemented. Ex post institutions are descriptions of rules in action. Thus the rule stipulating we
should drive on the left is an ex ante institution. The description of road rules in Britain which
says that drivers drive on the left 99 per cent of the time is a description of an ex post
institution. The traffic violations in this case are small enough not to make a substantial
difference but in other cases ex post violations may be significant. The divergence between ex
4ante and ex post institutions is usually due to secondary bargaining or conflict after an ex ante
institution has been introduced (WILLIAMSON 1985: 29). Policy discussions are about ex
ante rules. The  analysis of efficiency involves assessing the likely ex post outcomes.
Given the resource base, net social benefits are determined by a number of institutional and
non-institutional variables which constrain allocative and productive decisions. At the most
general level, 
NSB = N (r1, ...., ri,  x1, ..., xn) (1)
where NSB is the net social benefit, r1....ri are dummy variables representing institutions and
x1....xn are indices or dummy variables representing non-institutional variables. Institutions
include informal institutions such as norms (NORTH 1990, NORTH 1981, PLATTEAU
1994a, 1994b). Non-institutional variables include technology and the balance of power
between agents (BATES 1995, 1989, KNIGHT 1992, BOWLES 1985). The challenge for
institutional analysis is to predict how net social benefits will change as a result of  a change in
a specific institutional or non-institutional variable.
By definition the effect of institutions on net social benefits operates through the effect of
institutions on transaction costs. Transaction costs are defined as the costs of discovering the
appropriate transactions and subsequently agreeing and enforcing contracts (NORTH 1995:
18, EGGERTSSON 1990: 14, MATTHEWS 1986: 906). Since institutions have no effect on
resource endowments, their only effect on net social benefits is via transaction costs. It follows
that if institutional change results in higher net social benefits, it must be the case that the new
institutions are associated with lower transaction costs. This much is definitional. The question
is whether these institutions will always be associated with similar transaction cost effects.
Consider two alternative functional forms for the expression in (1). The first assumes that the
variables in (1) have additively separable effects as in
NSB = ("1r1 + "2r2 + ....+ "iri) + ($1x1 + $2x2 + ...+ $nxn) (2)
5Here the incremental effect of ri on y depends solely on its coefficient "i and not on the value
of any other variable or coefficient. Suppose that an existing institutional structure consists of
a number of institutions, r1....rh. Holding these and the values of the non-institutional variables
x1... xn constant, institution ri is introduced. Suppose this results in a change in net social benefits
of a magnitude denoted by )NSB(r i). This observation is sufficient to tell us the sign and
magnitude of "i. The introduction of ri in any other context will have an incremental transaction
cost effect on NSB of this sign and magnitude. 
Conventional transaction cost analysis does not directly measure transaction costs since these
are difficult to identify in direct observations (TOYE 1995: 64-66, MATTHEWS 1986: 917).
Instead, the implicit method is to read off the transaction cost effect by observing changes in
net social benefits brought about by institutional changes (DEMSETZ 1969, ALCHIAN and
DEMSETZ 1972, WILLIAMSON 1985, EGGERTSSON 1990). The implicit function
explaining the transaction cost effect in this incremental method of  analysis is of the form:
)NSB( ri ) = fTC ( ri ) (3)
The subscript TC on f indicates that the effect of ri on )NSB operates through changes in
transaction costs. With additive separability, the attribution of the transaction cost effect to ri
is valid. The institution ri will have a discrete transaction cost effect of this magnitude even if
other variables take different values. This follows from the additive separability of (2).
Separability, however, is a very special assumption which does not hold in many non-linear
relationships. Suppose net social benefits in (1) are determined by a simple non-separable
function such as:
NSB = "1r1(x1+....+xn) + "2r2(x1+....+xn) + ... + "iri(x1+....+xn) (4)
Consider as before a situation where institutions r1 to rh and non-institutional variables x1 to xn
are given. They are represented by the values of their indices or dummies. Institution ri is
introduced as before. In this case the effect of ri on NSB depends not only on the value of "i
but also on the values of x1....xn. Changes in the values of the latter can change both the
6magnitude and the sign of the )NSB associated with ri. 
Note that since resources are held constant, we can still describe the change in net social
benefits associated with ri in terms of changes in transaction costs associated with the
introduction of ri. But it is no longer possible to generalize from the observation any conclusions
about the intrinsic transaction cost characteristics of the institution. The effect is now contingent
on the positioning of the institution in a context defined by a combination of other variables. It
is theoretically possible for the same institution to have an effect of the opposite sign to the one
observed if it is introduced in a context with a different specification of variables. 
Institutional economists have recognized the possibility that the effect of institutions can be
additively non-separable with the effects of other institutions. BHAGWATI (1980) had
observed that the efficiency of ri can depend on the institutions r1...rh representing existing
institutions which we collectively term R. Amongst other things, R describes the existing
allocation of property rights over assets which determine relative prices and therefore the
measured change in net social benefits. This can be dealt with by amending (3) to record the
initial institutional structure which led to the observation. This is done in equation (5) which
recognizes that the transaction cost effect of ri should only be expected if initial institutional
situations are R-like.
)NSB(R 6 R + ri) = fTC ( R, ri ) (5)
This is not necessarily an impossible restriction for the theory as the relevant initial institutional
structure may be quite widely observed. However, we wish to consider the likelihood and
implications of non-separable effects of the non-institutional variables x1....xn. If important non-
separable effects can be identified, the implications for transaction cost analysis are serious. It
is far less feasible to restrict the applicability of an incremental analysis to situations which are
identical to the initial observation in all non-institutional variables as well. If we represent the x-
variables collectively by X, and if we allow all these variables to have possible non-separable
7effects with ri, we would have to further amend (5) to record all these values:
)NSB(R+X 6 R+X+ri) = fTC ( R, X, ri ) (6)
The transaction cost result summarized in this equation is virtually non-generalizable. The
probability of finding another conjuncture (R,X) where this observation may be useful is very
low. Thus if non-separability of the effects of a number of institutional and non-institutional
variables is a possibility, the incremental approach has to be abandoned. Greater attention has
to be given to identifying the functional form of (1) to identify the key variables with non-
separable effects and the nature of the interdependence. 
Institutional analysis does not often make explicit its assumption about the separability of
effects. In most cases, however, we can deduce from the range of institutions or variables being
considered that the implicit assumption is of additive separability. This is particularly clear in
earlier work where the effects of institutions on net benefits were considered without specifying
the values or conditions of other variables (see for instance DEMSETZ 1969, ALCHIAN and
DEMSETZ 1972, WILLIAMSON 1985, EGGERTSSON 1990). More recent work inspired
by NORTH (1990) does identify the importance of variables such as culture, ideology and
power in determining institutional efficiency. However, even here the incremental effects of
institutions are implicitly separately identifiable. 
For NORTH, efficient institutions are decentralized, well-defined private property rights (ibid:
61-69). The research agenda is to identify cultural, ideological and other variables which make
these institutions work better and to point out the possibility of path-dependant trajectories
which may permanently keep us away from the first best institutions. The possibility of other
institutions being equally efficient with different packages of cultures, distributions of power or
other variables is not recognized. This effectively maintains the assumption of additive
separability. Such an assumption is also implicit in attempts by institutional economists such as
PLATTEAU (1994 a, b) to identify the informal norms or moralities which allow "market
8economies" to work efficiently. The assumption is once again that the first best institutional
structures of the market economy can be independently identified and the moralities necessary
to make them work best identified subsequently.
II. MONITORING AND CONTESTATION COSTS
If institutional effects were additively non-separable with respect to a single non-institutional
variable this would not in itself be too damaging. An incremental transaction cost  analysis could
still be viable with applicability restricted to contexts where the particular non-institutional
variable had the same value as in the initial observation. However, in the general case the non-
separability problem is more serious and involves a number of institutional and non-institutional
variables. In this case the sign and magnitude of the effect of an institution on net social benefits
may depend on the values of a package of variables.
If our non-separable function resembles equation (4) the demonstration of non-separable
effects is considerably simplified. This is because in (4) the non-separable effect of ri can be
additively separated into a number of simpler non-separable components. Consider the last
term on the right hand side of equation (4). While the effect of ri on NSB is additively non-
separable with the effects of x1...xn, the total effect ("irix1+...+"irixn) can clearly be
decomposed into n additively separable components of NSB. If we can establish that for each
component the effect of ri is additively non-separable with a particular x, we will have shown
that the total effect of ri is additively non-separable with x1...xn. 
In an analogous manner, the total effect of an institution on net social benefits, )NSB( ri ), can
be decomposed into a number of additive components of which two are particularly important.
We will call these the monitoring cost component and the contestation cost component of
the institutional effect in (7). The monitoring cost component of )NSB( ri ) denoted
)MCC( ri ) is the part of )NSB( ri ) attributable to changes in the difficulty of monitoring
following the introduction of ri. The contestation cost component, )CCC( ri ), is the effect on
9)NSB( ri ) of any changes in the intensity of contestation following the introduction of ri. Any
remaining part of )NSB( ri ) is notionally explained by the change in other cost components
)OCC( ri ) which is a residual term. 
)NSB( ri ) /  - )MCC( ri )  -  )CCC( ri )  -  )OCC( ri ) (7)
Both the monitoring and contestation cost components of )NSB( ri ) are due to distinct sets
of transaction costs. The monitoring cost component is due to the transaction costs of detecting
and preventing shirking and opportunistic behaviour. The contestation cost component is due
to the transaction costs of enforcing institutions when one or more agents contest the choice of
that particular institution. Our aim will be to show that the effect of ri in determining the
magnitude of each of these components is additively non-separable with at least one x-variable.
This will establish that )NSB( ri ) is determined by the non-separable effects of ri and all these
x-variables. As (7) implies, the decomposition of the overall transaction cost effect of
institutions into two sub-components is not necessarily exhaustive and finer sub-divisions are
possible. Thus there is the possibility of identifying further non-separable effects.
MONITORING COSTS. Losses due to imperfect monitoring emerge whenever a productive
enterprise requires coordinating collective effort. Even pure coordination involves costs of
collecting and disseminating information. In addition team production can create incentives for
shirking or opportunistic behaviour. This can result in losses of net social benefits. One of the
ways in which institutions determine the magnitude of this loss is by determining the incentives
for efficiently monitoring tasks. If ri results in an improvement in monitoring efficiency, the
improvement in output is recorded in (7) as a negative )MCC( ri ) and an equivalent positive
effect on )NSB( ri ).
Monitoring is more efficient if some agents specialize in monitoring and have an incentive to
monitor. Institutions determine this efficiency by defining the rights and incentives to monitor,
often by making particular agents residual claimants (ALCHIAN and DEMSETZ 1972).
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Some agents are, however, more likely to be efficient residual claimants. Institutions which
establish these agents as residual claimants will have the biggest effect on lowering monitoring
costs. The relative monitoring efficiency of different institutional structures depends on a number
of variables which have been identified in the literature. These include the type of assets
involved, the variability of factors and the informal norms of agents.
CONTESTATION COSTS. All institutions are not equally acceptable to all agents. If some
agents contest the institution, net social benefits may be considerably lowered. Contestation can
take place at different levels. The most everyday form of contestation is of the rent-seeking
variety where resources are legally or illegally spent in trying to change institutions. Further up
the scale, contestation can take the form of deliberate deviations from the rules with the intent
of punishing other agents and signalling that these agents are determined to play a more
privately beneficial strategy. This form of contestation is the easiest to examine in game theory
models. The ability of agents to contest in this way is determined by their ability to hold out in
conflicts where some of the costs are borne by themselves. Finally, in the most extreme form
of contestation, extra-legal costs may be inflicted over and above non-cooperation. These
include in particular the costs of violence.
The contestation cost is larger the more determined disadvantaged agents are in contesting
particular institutions. When stable institutions emerge, their stability is usually based on the fact
that the willingness and ability to engage in contests differs amongst agents. While the
monitoring problem arises primarily as a result of incentives to shirk, the contestation
problem is primarily due to distributive conflicts over the choice of particular
institutions. It may sometimes be difficult to disentangle the two in practice but they are
theoretically distinct problems and have different determinants. 
In the next four sections we look at the determinants of the sign and magnitude of each of these
components of the institutional effect and the possibility of tradeoffs between them. We do this
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by examining four institutional choice situations. The first involves a comparison between two
institutions which make different sets of agents residual claimants. This analysis follows most
directly from existing discussions in the literature and is presented in the next section. This
example serves as a template for subsequent examples and so the argument is developed at
greater length.
III. ALTERNATIVE RESIDUAL CLAIMANTS
The institutional choice problem considered here is between two institutions rA and rB which
make one of two agent types, A and B respectively, residual claimants. Consider the monitoring
cost considerations first. This has been extensively discussed in the literature and we examine
two contributions. The first argues that if some assets are more firm-specific than others,
institutions which make owners of such assets residual claimants will result in the most efficient
monitoring and ceteris paribus the highest net social benefits (ALCHIAN 1987, PAGANO
1991). This is equivalent to achieving the biggest reduction in the monitoring cost component
of net social benefits. A second and closely related approach argues that if the technical ability
of factors to cause variations in net social benefits varies across factors, institutions which make
the owners of the more variable factor residual claimants will result in the biggest reduction in
the monitoring cost component of net social benefits (BARZEL 1989).
In both cases, monitoring efficiency is achieved by giving the right to monitor to the agent whose
monitoring produces the highest net social benefit. In the asset-specificity  analysis of
ALCHIAN (1987) and PAGANO (1991), technology defines which assets are more specific
to certain activities. Asset specificity is measured by the loss in value suffered by an asset when
transferred to the next best activity. Asset owners whose assets have a high degree of firm or
activity specificity will suffer the most from a decline in the fortunes of the collective enterprise.
Making the owners of these assets residual claimants ensures that the monitoring will be done
by the agents who stand to lose the most from enterprise failure in general and shirking in
particular. The gain in net social benefits as a result of efficient monitoring is thereby maximized.
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Figure 1 Monitoring Costs under alternative Residual Claimants
In the BARZEL approach there is no asset specificity but some factor owners can cause
greater variations in net social benefits either because of some feature of technology or because
quality variations are greater for some factor types. In this case the claim is that the factor
owner who can create the largest variation in net social benefits should become the residual
claimant. Here net social benefits are maximized not by giving the residual rights to the agent
with the greatest incentive to monitor but rather by giving the right to monitor to the agent who
it would cost the most to monitor. 
Note that the ALCHIAN and BARZEL arguments taken separately can give conflicting
answers. There is no reason why the owner of the more firm-specific asset should also be the
owner of the factor which has the more variable quality. Nevertheless a full specification of
technology and factor quality would allow us to identify the institution which brings about the
largest decline in the monitoring cost component in (7). This is shown in figure 1. 
The last row of Figure 1 is of particular interest. In absolute terms, the )NSB associated with
each institution can have a sign and magnitude which is determined by technology. This implies
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Figure 2 Potential Payoffs from Alternative Residual Claimants
that the effects of institutions and technologies on net social benefits are not additively
separable. The ranking of the two institutions in terms of monitoring efficiency is also shown.
In terms of equation (3), rA can be more or less efficient in saving transaction costs both
absolutely and relative to rB depending on the technology which is to be exploited through
cooperation. It is not enough for technology to be held constant. We need to have
technology specified, say along the left hand column of figure 1, to ensure that a particular
institution, say rA, will minimize monitoring costs.
Now consider the determinants of the contestation costs involved in setting up the two
institutions. Consider the payoffs in a game of coordination with conflict shown in figure 2. Two
agents have the option of cooperating in a team. We assume that net social benefits are highest
when team production is coordinated hierarchically with one agent as the  residual claimant. To
focus on contestation costs assume that the net social benefit does not depend on which of the
two agents is the residual claimant. The implicit technological assumption is that the agents do
not differ in terms of their asset specificity. However some version of Taylorism (see PAGANO
1991: 317-18) makes hierarchical management a source of greater efficiency. 
The two socially efficient strategy combinations are equivalent to the institutions rA and rB which
make A and B respectively the residual claimants. The net social benefit in both cases is 15
units but individual payoffs are differently distributed. Contestation results in lower net social
benefits of 2 units when both agents try to be the residual claimant. Equally, net social benefits
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are low when both individuals act as subordinates which can be interpreted as production
which is not hierarchically coordinated. For simplicity the net social benefit in this case as well
is assumed to be 2 units shared equally by the two agents.
In a non-cooperative game, rA and rB are both Nash equilibria but game theory does not tell
us which one will emerge. It is to each agent’s advantage to claim to play the Residual Claimant
strategy. If this commitment is credible, the best response of the other agent will be to accept
the role of subordinate. In dynamic models conflicts can occur when information is incomplete
regarding each agent’s holding power. Agents reveal their holding power through conflicts and
thereby acquire reputations for future interactions. While reputation is being established, the
social payoff is 2 units. 
Following the work of KREPS and WILSON (1982) conflicts have been modelled as games
of incomplete information. Stable institutions emerge once differential bargaining power has
been established (MAYNARD-SMITH 1982: 105,  OSBORNE and RUBINSTEIN 1990:
88-9, KNIGHT 1992: 126-36). Power in such models is usually defined as the differential
ability of agents to hold out in conflicts. Holding power is in turn based on differential asset
positions. A broader definition of power will be suggested later. The length of time over which
conflict strategies may be played is indeterminate as evident in the multiple equilibria in repeated
games with incomplete information (FUDENBERG and MASKIN 1986). 
Conflict does not disappear when a third-party enforcer is introduced. In textbook
presentations of the Leviathan solution, the third-party enforcer often resolves the distributive
conflict by selecting either rA or rB and introducing large punishments for deviation. While it is
true that a third-party enforcer can affect outcomes by changing payoffs, contests can still take
place. This is because the enforcer is often also involved in a game of incomplete information
and agents have an incentive to engage in conflicts to influence the enforcer’s decisions. It is
more realistic to see the problem as a transformed non-cooperative game with three agents, A,
15
Figure 3 The Enforcer’s Institutional Choice and the Probability of Conflict
B and the enforcer. 
A simplified version of the initial stages of such a game is presented in figure 3. Incomplete
information about agent type is shown by nature’s first move which determines whether A or
B is stronger. The enforcer is second mover and has incomplete information about agent type
shown by the information set in broken lines. The enforcer has prior beliefs about agent strength
which may be updated in the course of the game by observing the behaviour of agents. The
enforcer’s move involves selecting rA or rB with the aim of maximizing net social benefits. The
enforcer’s objective is common knowledge. Since stronger agents are more likely to contest
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being subordinates the enforcer’s objective is to make the stronger agent the residual claimant.
Following the enforcer’s move, subordinates have to decide whether to accept the institution
or contest it. The situation is similar to figure 2 with the difference that now there are
punishments for violators. We assume that the next move belongs to subordinates. If a
subordinate wishes to contest, the private payoff is no longer 1 unit (as in figure 2) but -5 as a
result of a punishment imposed by the enforcer. While the punishment makes contestation less
likely, it need not rule it out entirely. After observing whether contestation takes place or not,
the enforcer makes the next move (not shown in figure 3) by deciding whether to retain the
existing institution or to change it. 
In a repeated game of incomplete information and low time discount, contests can ensue as
agents try to establish reputations which will get them to their preferred equilibrium. Contests
are a signalling mechanism on the basis of which the enforcer can revise prior beliefs about
agent type. This can determine the institutional choice by the enforcer in a repetition of the game
on the basis of revised prior beliefs. If the initial institution favours the weaker agent, the
probability of contestation is very high as stronger agents signal their strength. Even when
institutions favour the stronger agent, weaker agents may occasionally try to convince the
enforcer that a mistake has been made. The sequence of payoffs is therefore indeterminate and
depends on the enforcer’s prior beliefs and the process of updating on the basis of observed
conflicts. 
Nevertheless some probabilistic conclusions can be drawn based on the likely responses of
agents shown by the paths in heavy lines in figure 3. Suppose for simplicity that the initial
situation is one of contests between the two agents which result in a social payoff of 2 units as
shown in figure 2. The average payoff per game may be higher than this if the agents
occasionally coordinate successfully. The enforcer introduces one of the two potential rules to
resolve this conflict. The social payoff over a finite number of repetitions of the game depends
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Figure 4 Contestation Costs under Alternative Residual Claimants
on the  accuracy of the enforcer’s prior beliefs about relative power. 
If A is stronger and the enforcer selects rA the probability of  contestation is low. An efficient
social payoff of 15 units is likely to be achieved in each repetition of the game unless the
enforcer has volatile beliefs about agent strength in the face of occasional contests by B. The
introduction of rA thus results in an increase in net social benefits of 13 units, from 2 to 15 per
period. This increase is due to a decline in contestation and so the contestation cost component
of the effect of rA is minus 13 units. On the other hand if B is the stronger agent and the enforcer
selects rA, B is very likely to contest this. The social payoff shown in figure 3 is now -4 (ignoring
the fines going to the enforcer). This is a decline in net social benefits of 6 units from 2 to -4
units and the contestation cost component of the effect of rB is therefore plus 6 units. 
Figure 4 summarizes these possibilities and shows that the contestation cost component of net
social benefits cannot be additively decomposed either. The magnitude and sign of the
contestation cost effect of an institution are jointly determined by the institution and the balance
of power into which it is introduced. 
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Figure 5 The Choice of Residual Claimant
Power in figure 4 can be broadly interpreted to include organizational and ideological as well
as economic power (see for instance MANN 1986, 1993). We have used power as the ability
to hold out in costly conflicts. The ability to hold out is not always based on the differential
ownership of assets. It can also be based on differences in organization across groups.
Moreover, power can be based on a differential willingness to engage in conflict. Willingness
to contest depends amongst other things on culture and ideology. These define what each group
considers to be legitimate. Agents who feel that some rights are unjust or illegitimate may
engage in conflicts which in purely economic terms they can ill afford. If their commitment to
defend their principles is credible, these agents are likely to end up with their preferred
equilibrium payoffs. Conflicts still act as signalling mechanisms in much the same way as before.
There are no a priori reasons to expect that the institutions which are efficient in ensuring
monitoring will also be efficient in ensuring low contestation costs. Figure 5 shows the
implications of superimposing the two sets of non-separable effects on each other. In real
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observations we only observe the effects of institutions on net social benefits. The distinction
between monitoring and contestation cost components is a notional one but may nevertheless
be useful for explaining why )NSB( ri ) can take many different values. The latter now
depends on the values of all variables with non-separable effects. The rows show monitoring
costs. A’s asset specificity or factor variability increases from bottom to top resulting in
)MCC(rA) falling and )MCC(rB) rising. The columns show contestation costs. A’s power
relative to B increases from left to right resulting in )CCC(rA) falling and )CCC(rB) rising.
We cannot preclude a priori any particular combination of the distribution of power, factor
qualities and asset specificity. It follows that the relative magnitude of the change in net social
benefits under rA and rB can take a range of values shown by the possibilities in the four boxes.
The distribution of power and asset specificity may be such that the monitoring and contestation
cost components pull in the same direction making one of the institutions much better than the
other. These possibilities are shown in the top right hand and bottom left hand boxes. In the
former rA and in the latter rB is clearly superior. As a result )NSB(rA) is maximized in the top
right hand box and )NSB(rB) in the bottom left hand one.
It is not necessary that the agents owning firm specific assets happen to be the ones who are
more powerful. These problematic combinations are shown in the top left hand and bottom
right hand boxes. Here the monitoring and contestation cost components of the institutional
effect pull in opposite directions. Consequently, the relative ranking of institutions as well as the
sign and magnitude of )NSB associated with each is indeterminate unless the sign and
magnitude of each cost component is known. This requires an identification of the effects of all
additively non-separable variables. Since there may be degrees of asset specificity as well as
variations in the distributions of power, it is possible that small changes in these variables can
result in the efficiency ranking of institutions switching. Thus even in this simple example of
selecting a residual claimant, the transaction cost effect of rA or rB is clearly determined by a
non-separable function as in equation (6).
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IV. HOW WELL DEFINED SHOULD RIGHTS BE?
By extending our search for the determinants of monitoring and contestation cost components
of institutional effects we can address a range of more realistic problems. In this section we
examine NORTH’s (1990) claim that well defined property rights lower transaction cost. Will
the policy decision to define property rights clearly always result in lower transaction costs?
This is an applied question relevant for many developing and transitional economies. In such
economies, rights over the residual in state owned enterprises are not clearly defined and are
implicitly split between a number of groups. These can include the central state, local state
authorities, managers, employees and consumers (LEE 1993: 180-1). It is not surprising that
monitoring efficiency is often low (TIROLE 1986). In theory the transition to privatization
should define property rights better by identifying exclusive, alienable residual claimants. These
could be proprietor/managers or shareholders. Monitoring efficiency should improve as a result.
The most efficient residual claimant depends on a number of variables including asset specificity
and factor variability as discussed in the last section. The institution which clearly defines rights
over the residual for a particular claimant is denoted by rC where the subscript indicates that
the right is clearly-defined. An alternative ex ante institution is rW where the rights of a
particular residual claimant are clearly defined over parts of the residual but remain weakly
defined over others. The degree of weakness is measured by the portion of the residual which
remains unclearly allocated with potential claims by other agents. We assume in figure 6 in line
with mainstream analysis of the agency problem (LEE 1993) that rC is always better than rW
in terms of monitoring efficiency. However, whether this recommends the choice of rC depends
on contestation costs.
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Figure 6 The Choice between Clearly-Defined and Weakly-Defined Rights
If the distribution of power is sufficiently concentrated such that potential beneficiaries dominate
other agents, rC will be superior to rW in terms of contestation costs too. If this is not the case,
the agents who stand to lose claims over parts of the residual as a result of rC being introduced
are likely to impose substantial contestation costs on net social benefits. Transferring discrete
components of the residual to the potential beneficiary one at a time is likely to minimize
contestation costs during the transition. As rights over successive components of the residual
are transferred to the efficient monitor, monitoring efficiency can increase but it is important that
contestation does not increase so much that this is wiped out. 
A consolidation of the power of the new class allows successive transfers to them in the future
at low contestation cost. This is shown in figure 6 as a contestation cost advantage for a
succession of rW institutions along the left hand column in a snapshot comparison of the two
institutions during the transition. Thus for some distributions of power, an ex ante policy
decision to support a succession of rW institutions during the transition which leads very
gradually to rC can outperform the ex ante choice of rC. 
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A comparison of aspects of the Chinese and Russian transition strategies of reforming their
industrial enterprises in the eighties lends support to these possibilities. The Chinese transition
strategy was decidedly slower in terms of transferring rights. Rights over the residual in large
enterprises remained weakly defined even though there was a discernible transfer of rights
towards enterprise managers. The slow rate of this transfer throughout the eighties meant that
incentive structures for monitoring were not optimal and monitoring efficiency was lower than
it could have been (LEE 1993: 182, 185, 191). On the other hand, contestation costs were low
as well so that the net effect of the small improvements in monitoring efficiency remained
positive. There was a considerable improvement in the performance of Chinese large-scale
enterprises throughout this period (NOLAN 1996).
In contrast, the much more rapid transition to an ex ante blueprint of clearly defined rights in
Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union has been described as capitalism by fiat (PEJOVICH
1994). The ex ante rights created by privatization did not translate into ex post rights of the
western type because of high levels of contestation through legal and extra-legal means.
Manifestations of this contestation included employee unrest, the extraction of rents by mafia-
like protection rackets and regional conflicts. The distribution of power in the transitional
economies was such that contestation costs were likely to be high with a rapid transition to
clearly defined rights. The left-hand column of figure 6 shows that for some distributions of
power and potential monitoring gains, the improvement in net social benefits may be higher with
rW than rC. Indeed it is possible for )NSB( rC ) to actually be negative in some situations. Even
allowing for the differences between China and Eastern Europe, their differential success with
industrial reform can to some extent have been due to the non-separable effects of variables
frequently ignored in transaction cost analysis.
V. ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONS: LARGE VERSUS SMALL FIRMS
The search for non-separable effects can be extended to more complex institutional choice
problems. In this section we consider alternative firm structures. Transaction cost analysts have
23
attempted to identify the factors which determine whether large hierarchical firms (rL) or smaller
less hierarchical firms (rS) are likely to be more efficient. This efficiency analysis can be an input
into policy aimed at encouraging particular types of firm structure.
A number of technological variables determine the relative monitoring cost efficiency of large
versus small firms. These include the lumpiness of the assets subject to asset specificity and the
number of firm specific assets whose appropriable quasi-rents are interdependent. Lumpy
assets subject to asset specificity can induce large firm size because  of the monitoring costs of
leasing in the services of such assets. An owner of such assets who attempted to lease out
services to smaller firms would be subject to potential opportunistic ex post contract violations
on the part of purchasers who would attempt to hold the owner hostage (KLEIN,
CRAWFORD and ALCHIAN 1978, WILLIAMSON 1985). 
Monitoring costs could be saved by the owner setting up production on his own. Lumpiness
then induces a large enough scale to ensure optimal use. If there are a number of such assets
whose appropriable quasi-rents can be appropriated by opportunistic bargaining in this way,
monitoring costs are saved by incorporating all these assets in a single firm. The relative
monitoring cost advantage of large and small firms are shown in the top and bottom rows of
figure 7. An increase in the lumpiness and number of firm specific assets makes large firms more
efficient in saving monitoring costs.
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Figure 7 The Choice between Large and Small Firms
The contestation cost effects of large versus small firms depends on the balance of power
defined by the asset-base and ideologies of the agents affected. If power is dispersed, the
concentration of asset ownership in large firms is likely to lead to high contestation costs. The
contestation could take the form of rent-seeking activity to persuade policy makers to break
up "monopolies" or even more direct political contests. One of the objectives of the asset-
specificity  analysis of WILLIAMSON was to show that the political concern with monopolies
in the U.S. was misguided (1985: 365-84). However antitrust legislation in the U.S. was not
initially driven solely or even largely by economic models which happened to be wrong. 
BENSEL (1990) has shown that contestation by Southern states fearful of the concentration
of economic power in the North following the Civil War played a key role in the introduction
of the Sherman Antitrust Act in the late nineteenth century. However the North had just won
the Civil War and the contestation of the antitrust lobby which resulted in the Sherman Act
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implied low contestation costs for the emerging corporate giants. In many developing countries,
contestation from powerful middle class groups is an important source of contestation costs
faced by large firms. In many cases such contestation can more than wipe out their relative
monitoring efficiency.
In societies where power is more concentrated the contestation cost implications of the two
institutions can switch. Large firms may no longer have higher contestation costs if the
beneficiaries also happen to be the more powerful agents in society. Indeed, if power is very
concentrated, small firms may face higher contestation costs if powerful agents engage in
predatory raiding or seek to create artificial advantages for large firms by rent-seeking activities.
While the patterns suggested are simplistic, the indeterminacy is consistent with the arguments
of industrial sociologists like WHITLEY who show that the efficiency of firm structures
depends on the authority structures in which they operate (1992: 5). In the successful East
Asian economies the predominant firm structure has varied from the relatively small family
businesses which play an important role in Hong Kong and Taiwan to the giant South Korean
chaebol. WHITLEY’s argument suggests that firms operate effectively if residual claimants are
able to harness power structures necessary for the efficient operation of that firm. Our
terminology provides a language for an economic analysis of these inter-dependencies. 
The efficiency of relatively small firms in Taiwan was based on a combination of small-scale
technologies and a dispersed distribution of power amongst the native Taiwanese capitalists
who were primarily involved in this sector. Paradoxically, the mainlander dominated
authoritarian state was to a large extent responsible for the dispersion of power within this
sector. It was fearful of concentrations of economic power in native Taiwanese hands and
prevented any section from enjoying preferential access to the state. This combination of
dispersed power and relatively small-scale technologies allowed small firms to be efficient as
in the bottom left-hand box in figure 7. However there were key industries where assets were
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lumpy and these were largely kept in the public sector. Here the relevant distribution of power
was between the authoritarian mainlander dominated political leadership of the Kuomintang and
the rest of society. The contestation faced by public enterprises was consequently low. This
produced the efficient combination of firm structures, distributions of power and technologies
shown in the top right hand box of figure 7 (WADE 1990: 262-276). 
In contrast, South Korea’s industrial strategy was based on technologies with much more
lumpy assets and most of these were concentrated in giant private sector chaebol. These
operated in a political context where the immense concentration of resources could be
sustained at low contestation cost. The concentration of power which allowed this was not
based on the prior existence of powerful private sector agents. Rather it was based on the
successful creation of an authoritarian political settlement by Park Chung Hee’s coup in 1961
which allowed the state to create the concentrations of private wealth necessary for its industrial
policy (AMSDEN 1989). The concentration of political power and its deployment to protect
the chaebol meant that contestation from excluded sections of society was low (WHITLEY
1992: 183-197).
These successful developing countries were in many ways exceptional. There are many
examples of developing countries where optimal combinations of technologies, power
distributions and institutional structures did not emerge. An example is Pakistan’s attempt at
industrial policy in the sixties. Like South Korea,  Pakistan attempted to exploit technologies
with scale economies by encouraging the creation of large holding companies with preferential
subsidies. One of the factors eventually leading to the failure of this strategy was the heavy
contestation of the distribution of assets by excluded sections of society (KHAN 1989, 1995).
A relatively dispersed distribution of power placed Pakistan in the top left hand corner of figure
7 where contestation costs were high enough to wipe out the monitoring cost advantage of large
firms using lumpy assets. 
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The contestation costs facing large firms in Pakistan does not necessarily mean that the
Taiwanese institutional mix would have worked better. Taiwan depended on the initial location
of lumpy investments in a public sector facing low contestation costs. In most developing
countries the public sector too does not enjoy the power conditions to allow these technologies
to operate. Contestation by excluded groups in such countries also implies large contestation
cost effects for public sector enterprises (see for instance BHASKAR and KHAN 1995). 
Critical evaluations of industrial efficiency in developing countries often concentrate on the
causes of intra-firm monitoring failure. By distinguishing between monitoring and contestation
costs, we may instead find that a substantial part of the inefficiency in poorly performing
countries is due to contestation costs. This is important because the determinants of these
inefficiencies are quite different. A consideration of figure 7 suggests that given a limited choice
of technologies, the efficient operation of firms may require making the distribution of power
a policy variable in some developing countries. 
VI. INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS: CULTURES AND MORALITIES
Informal institutions are typically norms defined by culture and ideology. The economic effect
of norms has received a great deal of attention (GAMBETTA 1988, ELSTER 1989, NORTH
1990, PLATTEAU 1994a, 1994b). The interest in culture stems from the observation that
different cultures stress different combinations of norms. When formal institutions attempt to
solve free rider problems, the presence or absence of norms can have an effect on monitoring
costs. Thus the introduction of private property rights is likely to have a bigger effect on net
social benefits if people are predisposed to respect property rights. Most of the institutional
interest in culture has come from this perspective. 
As with successful institutions, economists have sought to identify common features in the norms
observed in successful economies. PLATTEAU (1994a, 1994b) argues that the distinctive
feature of the cultures underlying the successful market economies of the western world is that
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they support generalized morality. Morality is generalized when normative principles of
reciprocity go beyond kin to become applicable in general (1994b: 770). PLATTEAU
identifies the Church (both Catholic and Protestant) as having "played a central role in the
process of moral norm generation and maintenance throughout modern western history" which
contributed to the lowering of monitoring costs (ibid: 771). 
Whether the evidence allows us to conclude that Christianity did have such an effect on
monitoring costs can be disputed (MOORE 1994: 827-8). We could also dispute whether
particularism in developing countries is due to non-generalized morality or other factors.
However we will concentrate on a different problem which is more serious for PLATTEAU’s
claim that generalized moralities are a precondition for the efficient operation of market
economies. Like formal institutions, the informal institutions implicit in cultures can have both
contestation and monitoring cost implications. This is because cultures, particularly religious
ones, can simultaneously define both the boundaries within which trust is applicable as well as
distributive values within these boundaries. A generalized morality can be egalitarian or
hierarchical as PLATTEAU recognizes (ibid: 770-71). Equally, particularistic or less
generalized norm structures can also be egalitarian or hierarchical within different boundaries.
We denote a generalized norm structure by rg and a norm structure more restricted in its
applicability by rp. Norms create stable expectations within a more or less widely defined
group. Generalized moralities define a wider group for which the norms are applicable. We can
agree with PLATTEAU that the more generalized the norm, the wider the scope of its
applicability and ceteris paribus, the lower the monitoring costs for a wide range of activities.
This is shown in the top row of figure 8. 
However, the structure of norms also defines distributive claims which can intensify or dampen
the conflicts inherent in the operation of particular technologies. To simplify the discussion we
assume that generalized norms are more egalitarian than particularistic ones. This is not an
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Figure 8 Generalized versus Particularistic Norms
unreasonable assumption given that generalized norm structures tend to be justified by an
appeal to universalist principles.  Hierarchical or egalitarian norms have contestation cost
implications by determining the legitimacy of particular distributive allocations and the
willingness of agents to contest contrary allocations. The contestation cost implications are
summarized in figure 8.
MANN’s ambitious (1986) work on historical sociology suggests that Christianity may indeed
have had a positive effect on the growth of market exchanges in Europe from the medieval
period onwards. In MANN’s account, its effect was most pronounced over the tenth to the
twelfth centuries when technologies were relatively small scale (ibid: 373-413). Despite peasant
revolts on the basis of Christianity’s egalitarian appeal, the effects of the reduction in the
monitoring costs of long distance trade predominated. However, as technologies and
particularly military technologies became more hierarchical, nation states and the ideologies of
nationalism gained prominence. This was perhaps fortunate for Europe because it is likely that
despite a growing hierarchization of the church, internal contradictions between egalitarian and
hierarchical interpretations of Christianity would in the end have resulted in high contestation
costs.
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The contemporary role of Islam in many developing countries illustrates how generalized
moralities may not be sufficient for the market order with modern technological conditions. With
more hierarchical technologies, generalized moralities with egalitarian interpretations can result
in high contestation costs. In contrast, hierarchical secular philosophies in East Asian countries
have been more successfully adapted in support of emergent capitalism. Rather than general
principles applicable to all, these have stressed loyalty to closely defined groups and high levels
of intra-group discipline. The  group at its broadest has been the nation. South Korean elites,
for instance, were successful in drawing on traditional patriarchal kin-based loyalties as well as
norms of nationalistic discipline inherited from the Japanese to construct the norms supporting
the chaebol-dominated economy (SUH 1989, JANELLI 1993). 
These norms have not necessarily been very efficient in terms of lowering monitoring costs. For
instance, there is substantial evidence of large-scale corruption in South Korea on the part of
powerful agents dominating the economy (KHAN 1996). If norms had a part to play in the
success of this economy, it is more plausible to argue that the hierarchical and particularistic
norms contributed to keeping contestation costs low. For its package of technology, power and
formal institutions, norms which were quite different from the generalized morality of early
Christianity proved very efficient.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have discussed a number of non-separable effects which determine the overall transaction
costs and hence the efficiency associated with institutions. The argument has been presented
in general terms as well as with reference to a number of more specific institutional choice
problems. At the general level we have concentrated on two components of the transaction
cost effect of institutions to arrive at some conclusions.
i) To identify the efficiency effects of institutions all variables with non-separable effects
need to be identified. With multiple non-separable effects we cannot say whether an institution
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is better than another in terms of overall transaction costs unless we know the values of all
variables with additively non-separable effects. This limits the applicability of the incremental
transaction cost methodology described in section II and discussed in specific examples. The
function determining the transaction cost effect of an institution is similar to equation (6) where
the values of a number of institutional and non-institutional variables have to be specified to fix
the transaction cost effect.
ii) Tradeoffs between different components of the institutional effect are important. It is
unrealistic to construct an analysis which has its applicability restricted to the conjunctures of
conditions which were present in the initial observation. Consequently, analysis must seek to
identify the most important components of the transaction cost effect and the variables which
have non-separable effects on each of these components. The tradeoffs between different
components of net social benefits need to be identified as institutions are changed with given
values or ranges of values for other variables. The monitoring and contestation cost components
of the institutional effect are particularly important. If institutional change improves monitoring
costs but worsens contestation costs, we would want to know the severity of the tradeoff. 
iii) Other variables such as informal institutions may also have non-separable effects. The
complications created by non-separable effects are equally damaging for attempts to identify
in isolation the effects of other variables with non-separable effects. Formal institutions,
technologies, balances of power and informal institutions can have additively non-separable
effects on monitoring and contestation costs. With non-separability we are likely to observe
efficient or inefficient combinations of norms, distributions of power, technologies and formal
institutions. Cultural features which proved to be efficiency enhancing in some contexts may
prove to be efficiency-retarding in others.
iv) Policy need not and sometimes cannot be restricted to institutional change alone.
With non-separable effects the combination of variable values may be such that institutional
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policy alone may sometimes fail to have much of an effect on net social benefits. We have seen
that the distribution of power in particular may be such that efficiency enhancing policy options
may be very restricted. Under these circumstances analysis of the different components of the
institutional effect is necessary to identify possible directions of change for other variables. If
the distribution of power has non-separable effects, policy making may sometimes have to be
explicitly political and attempt to change the distribution of power directly. 
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